Abstract. Suppose that each member of a set of agents has a preference list of a subset of houses, possibly involving ties, and each agent and house has their capacity denoting the maximum number of houses/agents (respectively) that can be matched to him/her/it. We want to find a matching M , called popular, for which there is no other matching M such that more agents prefer M to M than M to M , subject to a suitable definition of "prefers". In the above problem each agent uses exactly one vote to compare two matchings. In the other problem we consider in the paper each agent has a number of votes equal to their capacity. Given two matchings M and M , an agent compares their best house in matching M \(M ∩M ) to their best house in matching M \(M ∩ M ) and gives one vote accordingly, then their second best houses and so on. A matching M for which there is no matching M such that M gets a bigger number of votes than M , when M and M are compared in the way described above, is then called clan-popular. Popular matchings have been studied quite extensively, especially in the one-to-one setting. In the many-to-many setting we provide a characterisation of popular and clanpopular matchings, show N P -hardness results for very restricted cases of the above problems and for certain versions describe novel polynomial algorithms. The given characterisation is also valid for popular matchings in the one-to-one setting.
Introduction
In the paper we study popular and clan-popular b-matchings, which in other words are popular many-to-many matchings. The problems can be best described in graph terms: We are given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ H, E), a capacity function on vertices b : A ∪ H → N and a rank function on edges r : E → N . A stands for the set of agents and H for the set of houses. For a ∈ A and h ∈ H r((a, h)) = i means that house h belongs to (one of) agent a's ith choices. We say that a prefers h 1 to h 2 (or ranks h 1 higher than h 2 ) if r((a, h 1 )) < r((a, h 2 )). If r(e 1 ) < r(e 2 ) we say that e 1 has a higher rank than e 2 . If there exist a ∈ A and h 1 , h 2 ∈ H a , h 1 = h 2 such that r(e 1 ) = r((a, h 1 )) = r(e 2 ) = r((a, h 2 )), then we say that e 1 , e 2 belong to a tie and graph G contains ties. Otherwise we say that G does not contain ties. A b-matching M of G is such a subset of edges that deg M (v) ≤ b(v) for every v ∈ A ∪ H, meaning that every vertex v has at most b(v) edges of M incident with it. For every v ∈ A ∪ H by M (v) we mean the set {w ∈ A ∪ H : (v, w) ∈ M }. With each agent a and each b-matching M we associate a signature denoted as sig M (a) defined as follows. Definition 1. Let s denote the greatest rank (i.e. the largest number) given to any edge of E. Let (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y t ) denote the ranks of all edges (a, h) such that h ∈ M (a) sorted non-decreasingly. By sig M (a) we will denote a b(a)-tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . x b(a) ) such that x i = y i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and x i = s + 1 for i > t.
We introduce a lexicographic order on signatures as follows. We will say that (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d ) (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y d ) if there exists j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ d and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1 we have x i = y i and x j < y j . We say that an agent a prefers b-matching M to M if sig M (a) sig M (a). M is more popular than M , denoted by M M , if the number of agents that prefer M to M exceeds the number of agents that prefer M to M .
Definition 2.
A b-matching M is popular if there exists no b-matching M that is more popular than M . The popular b-matching problem is to determine if a given triple (G, b, r) admits a popular b-matching and find one if it exists.
The popular b-matching problem has applications in one-sided markets, where agents are allowed to have more than one house and one house can be owned by more than one agent. The problem is a generalisation of the one considered in [19] in which each agent is allowed to have at most one house, but each house can be owned by more than one agent. Clearly the version we consider is no less natural than the one in [19] .
In the popular b-matching problem we assume that each agent has one vote and given two b-matchings M and M , they vote +1, −1 or 0 depending on the case being respectively that they prefer M to M or M to M or are indifferent between M and M .
In the clan-popular b-matching problem we will assume that each agent has a number of votes equal to their capacity. Given two b-matchings M and M agent a compares their best house in matching M \ (M ∩ M ) to their best house in matching M \ (M ∩ M ) and gives one vote accordingly (1, −1 or 0), then their second best houses and so on. More formally, for two b-matchings M and M and agent a we define
, where signum(x) = 1, 0 or −1 if correspondingly x > 0, x = 0 or x < 0 and sig M (a) i denotes the i-th position in sig M (a). We will say that a b-matching M is more clan-popular than M if a∈A vote a (M, M ) > 0. A b-matching M will be called clan-popular if there does not exist a b-matching M that is more clanpopular than M .
Another application of the clan-popular b-matching problem is as follows. Suppose we are given a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has capacity 1 and each house has an arbitrary capacity. Agents are partitioned into clans and all agents from the same clan have the same preferences over houses. In graph terms it means we are given a graph G = (A ∪ Previous work The notion of popularity was first introduced by Gärdenfors [4] in the one-to-one and two-sided context, where two-sided means that both agents and houses express their preferences over the other side and a matching M is popular if there is no other matching M such that more participants (i.e. agents plus houses) prefer M to M than prefer M to M . (He used the term of a majority assignment.) He proved that every stable matching is a popular matching if there are no ties. One-sided popular matchings were first studied in the one-to-one setting by Abraham et al. in [1] . They proved that a popular matching need not exist and described fast polynomial algorithms to compute a popular matching, if it exists. Manlove and Sng in [14] extended an algorithm from [1] to the one-tomany setting (notice that this not equivalent to the many-to-one setting.) Other results concerning popular matchings appeared in [2] , [3] , [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] .
Our contribution We provide a characterisation of popular b-matchings and prove that the popular b-matching problem is N P -hard even when agents use only two ranks and have capacity at most 2 and houses have capacity 1. This in particular answers the question about many-to-one popular matchings asked in [14] . Next we modify the notion of popularity and consider clan-popular bmatchings. We give their characterisation and show that finding a clan-popular b-matching or reporting that it does not exist is N P -hard even if all agents use at most three ranks, there are no ties and houses have capacity 1. The given characterisations allow checking whether a given b-matching is popular or corresp. clan-popular in time polynomial in the number of edges. The characterisation remains valid in the one-to-one setting (both characterisations denote the same thing then) and thus provides an alternative way of checking whether a given matching is popular, moreover in linear (in the number of edges) time. (In the presence of ties an algorithm in [1] computing a popular matching, if it exists, runs in O( √ nm) time, where n, m denote the number of vertices and edges resp..) Algorithmically, the most interesting (in our opinion) part concerns polynomial algorithms for clan-popular b-matchings. We construct a novel polynomial algorithm computing a clan-popular b-matching, if it exists, for the version in which agents have capacity 2 and use two ranks, houses have arbitrary capacities and there are no ties.
Characterisations
First we introduce some terminology and recall a few facts from the matching theory. By a path P we will mean a sequence of edges. Usually a path P will be denoted as (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k ), where v 1 , . . . , v k are vertices from the graph G = (V, E), not necessarily all different, and for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) (v i , v i+1 ) ∈ E and no edge of G occurs twice in P . We will sometimes treat a path as a sequence of edges and sometimes as a set of edges. Let M be a b-matching. Then we will say that v is unsaturated,
we will also use the terms matched and unmatched instead of saturated and unsaturated. If e ∈ M we will call e an M -edge and otherwise -a non-M -edge. A path is said to be alternating (with respect to M ) or M -alternating if its edges are alternately M -edges and non-M -edges. An alternating path is said to be (M -)augmenting if its end vertices are unsaturated and both its first and last edge is a non-M -edge. For two sets
If M is a b-matching and P is an alternating path with respect to M such that (1) its beginning edge (v 1 , v 2 ) is an M -edge or v 1 is unsaturated and (2) its ending edge
We will also need a notion of an equal path: a path (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k ) is defined to be equal if it is alternating, (v 1 , v 2 ) is a non-M -edge and for each i,
An equal cycle is an equal path of the form (a 1 , h 1 , a 2 , h 2 , . . . , h k , a 1 ) and such that edges (h k , a 1 ), (a 1 , h 1 ) have the same rank. We will call an equal path (v 1 = a 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k ) smooth if a 1 is unsaturated or there exists a house h ∈ M (a 1 ) such that r((a 1 , h)) > r((a 1 , v 2 )). Theorem 1. A b-matching M is popular iff graph G does not contain a path of one of the following four types:
and (a 1 , h 1 , . . . , h k , a) are smooth and (b) agents a 1 , a, a 1 are pairwise different, 3. (a 1 , h 1 , . . . , h k ), where the path is smooth and h k is unsaturated, 4. (a 1 , h 1 , . . . , h k , a 1 ) , where the path (a 1 , h 1 , . . . , h k ) is equal and r((h k , a 1 )) > r ((a 1 , h 1 ) ).
Proof. Let M be a popular b-matching. Suppose the graph contains a path P 1 of type (1) . If a 1 is saturated let P 1 = P 1 ∪e (notice that e / ∈ P 1 ), otherwise let P 1 =
) and for each a different from a 1 , a k , a k+1 we have sig M (a) = sig M (a). Therefore M is more popular than M .
Suppose the graph contains a path P 3 of type (3) . If a 1 is saturated let P 3 = P 3 ∪ e, otherwise let
sig M (a 1 ) and for each a different from a 1 we have sig M (a) = sig M (a). Therefore M is more popular than M .
If the graph contains a path of type (2) or (4), we proceed analogously. For the other direction suppose now that M is not popular. There exists then a b-matching M which is more popular than M . This means that the set A 1 of agents who prefer M to M outnumbers the set A 2 of agents who prefer M to M .
As a preprocessing step, we remove from M ⊕ M all equal cycles. Therefore from now on, we will assume that M ⊕ M does not contain equal cycles. For each a ∈ A 1 we build a path P a in the following way. We will use only edges of M ⊕M . We start with an edge (a, h 1 ) ∈ M \M having the highest possible rank (i.e. lowest possible number). Now assume that our so far built path P a ends on h i . If h i is unsaturated in M , we end. Otherwise we consider edges (h i , a i ) belonging to M \ M and not already used by other paths P a (a ∈ A 1 ). (The set of such unused edges is nonempty as h i is saturated in M and thus there are at least as many M -edges as M -edges incident with h i and each time we arrive at h i while building some path P a (a ∈ A 1 ) we use one M -edge and one M -edge.) If among these edges, there is such one that a i ∈ A 1 we add it to P a and stop. Otherwise if there is such one that a i ∈ A 2 we add it to P a and stop. Otherwise a i has the same signature in M and in M . Therefore there exists an edge (a i , h i+1 ) ∈ M \ M having the same rank as (h i , a i ) and there exists an unused edge of this kind because the number of edges of rank, say, s in M incident with a i is the same as the number of rank s edges in M incident with a i , we add such edge to P a .
Clearly we stop building P a at some point because we either arrive at an unsaturated vertex h ∈ H or at a vertex of A 1 ∪ A 2 , which may be a itself. Suppose there exists a ∈ A 1 such that P a ends on a. Since P a starts with an edge e of M (a) \ M (a) having the highest rank and M ⊕ M does not contain equal cycles, the ending edge of P a must have a lower rank than e, hence P a is a path of type (4) . If there exists a path P a ending on an unsaturated vertex, it is of type (3). If there exists a ∈ A 1 such that P a ends on a 1 ∈ A 1 , a 1 = a, then let e = (h , a 1 ) denote the ending edge of P a and let e 0 = (a, h 1 ) denote the starting edge of P a . Since a 1 ∈ A 1 the edge of M (a 1 ) \ M (a 1 ) having the highest rank, let us call it e , has a higher rank than e. Suppose e = (a 1 , h). If there exists an edge e 3 = (h, a) ∈ M \ M , cycle P a ∪ e ∪ e 3 forms a path of type (1) or (4) depending on whether e 3 has the same rank as e 0 or higher. Otherwise there exists an edge e 3 = (h, a 2 ) ∈ M \ M , where a 2 = a and of course a 2 = a 1 and path P a ∪ e ∪ e 3 forms a path of type (1) . If none of the above paths exists, each P a ends on some agent a 2 ∈ A 2 . Because A 2 outnumbers A 1 there exist a 1 , a 1 ∈ A 1 , a 1 = a 1 and a 2 ∈ A 2 such that P a1 and P a 1 both end on a 2 . These paths are edge-disjoint and together form a path of type (2).
2
The second part of the above proof indicates a polynomial time algorithm for checking the popularity of a given b-matching. In case of popular matchings (i.e. 1-matchings) the algorithm runs in time linear in the number of edges.
Next we give a characterisation of clan-popular b-matchings.
Theorem 2. A b-matching M is clan-popular iff graph G does not contain a path of type (3) or (4) from Theorem 1 or a path of type (1 ), which is any path (a 1 , . . . , h k−1 , a k , h k , a k+1 ), where (a) the path is alternating, (b) path
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
Notice that a popular b-matching need not be clan-popular.
Polynomial algorithms for clan-popular b-matchings
First we state the following NP-hardness results.
Theorem 3. The problem of deciding whether a given triple (G, b, r) has a popular b-matching is N P -hard, even if all edges are of one of two ranks, each agent a ∈ A has capacity at most 2 and each house h ∈ H has capacity 1.
Theorem 4. The problem of deciding whether a given triple (G, b, r) admits a clan-popular b-matching is N P -hard, even if all edges are of one of three ranks, each agent a ∈ A has capacity at most 3, each house h ∈ H has capacity 1 and there are no ties.
The proofs are omitted due to space constraints. We will now give an algorithm for the version in which there are no ties, each agent uses two ranks and has capacity 2, and houses have arbitrary capacities. (This algorithm can be easily extended to the one where we allow agents to have capacity 1 and use only one rank.) The underlying graph is J = (A ∪ H, E). Without loss of generality we can assume that agents use rank 1 and rank 2 edges.
Let
First we observe the following. Proof. Assume, that a clan-popular b-matching M restricted to rank 1 edges (called M 1 ) is not a maximum b 1 -matching of J 1 . Then in J 1 there exists an M 1 -augmenting path, which must be of the form (a, h), where a is not matched in M 1 . Since M is clan-popular, h is saturated in M . Therefore there exists a such that (a , h) ∈ M and (a , h) ∈ E 2 . It is not difficult to see that M \ {(a , h)} ∪ {(a, h)} must also be a clan-popular b-matching of J. We can proceed in this way until we have a clan-popular b-matching of J that contains a maximum b 1 -matching of J 1 . 2
From Lemma 1 we know that if J contains a clan-popular b-matching, then there exists a clan-popular b-matching M = M 1 ∪ M 2 of J such that M 1 is a maximum b 1 -matching of J 1 and M 2 is a maximum b 2 -matching of J 2 .
The key property of clan-popular b-matchings is stated in Lemma 2. If J has a clan-popular b-matching, then there exists such a clanpopular b-matching M = M 1 ∪ M 2 that M 1 is a maximum b 1 -matching of J 1 and M 2 is a b 2 -matching of J 2 and M has the following property. Let h ∈ H be such that
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from Lemma 1. Suppose that some a ∈ N 2 (h) is matched in M 2 and unmatched in
there exists some a ∈ N 2 (h) that is unmatched in M 2 . Let h , a be such that (a, h ) ∈ E 1 and (h , a ) ∈ M 1 (such (h , a ) exists because M 1 has maximum cardinality.) If a = a , then (a , h, a, h , a ) forms a path of type (1 ) and thus M is not clan-popular. Therefore a = a . But we can remove from M edge (a , h ) and add (a, h ) and obtain another clan-popular b-matching of J. This way we diminish the number of agent vertices in N 2 (h), who are matched in M 2 but not in M 1 . Proceeding in this way we obtain the wanted b-matching. 2
We are going to use the algorithm for the following problem. In the two levelmatching problem we are given a graph G consisting of two bipartite graphs
, where sets B 1 , B 2 are disjoint. We want to find M 1 , M 2 , where M 1 is a matching of G 1 , M 2 is a matching of G 2 such that if a ∈ A is matched in M 2 , it is also matched in M 1 . Such two matchings M 1 , M 2 are called a two-level matching of G. In the maximum two-level matching problem we want to find a two-level matching of maximum cardinality, i.e. such one that |M 1 ∪ M 2 | is maximised. The algorithm for computing a maximum twolevel matching is given in [18] .
(The above algorithm extends in an obvious way to b-matchings i.e. to the version in which each vertex of B 1 , B 2 can be incident with more than one edge.)
Because of Lemma 1 we can assume that J 1 , J 2 are such that 
Let J First we show that J does not contain a path of type (1 ) . Suppose to the contrary that J contains some path P = (a 1 , h 1 , a 2 , h 2 , a 3 ) of type (1 ) . Then edges (a 1 , h 1 ), (h 1 , a 2 ) must be of rank 2 and edges (a 2 , h 2 ), (h 2 , a 3 ) of rank 1. Therefore a 1 is unsaturated in M . Also a 1 = a 2 (since a 2 has a rank 2 edge incident with him/her and a 1 does not). Since a 1 = a 2 and h 1 is saturated (otherwise P would be a path of type (3)), we get that a 1 , a 2 ∈ A + . However from the fact that M is a two-level matching we know that since a 2 has a rank 2 edge incident with him/her, he/she has also a rank 1 edge incident with him/her. Therefore no path of type (1 ) occurs in the graph.
J cannot contain a path of type (3) because each h ∈ H + 2 is saturated in M and a path of type (3) ending on some h ∈ (H 1 ∪ H 2 ) \ H + 2 would have to be contained in J 1 . This would mean that M ∩ E 1 is not a maximum cardinality b 1 -matching of J 1 and this that M is not a maximum two-level matching of J.
Because there are no ties, a path of type (4) does not exist in the graph either.
For the other part of the lemma, suppose J contains a clan-popular bmatching M . Let M denote all edges of E 2 incident with A \ A + and let M denote M \ M . If some h ∈ H + 2 is unsaturated in M or an edge of E 2 incident with some vertex of A \ A + does not belong to M , then J contains a path of type (3) beginning with some unsaturated a ∈ A and M is not clan-popular. By Lemma 2 we can assume that M is a two-level matching. If M were not a maximum two-level matching, it would mean that M ∩ E 1 is not a maximum b 1 -matching of J 1 . It is so because of the following. Since each h ∈ H + 2 is saturated in M , we cannot increase the number of E 2 -edges in M and thus if M is not a maximum two-level matching, then we can increase the number of E 1 -edges in M . If M ∩ E 1 is not a maximum b 1 -matching of J 1 , then M is not a clan-popular b-matching of J, because J contains a path of type (3) . In the extended version of the paper we present also the algorithm for the setting in which ties among rank 2 edges are allowed.
